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As a new round of talks to reunify Cyprus continues, there is a real 
sense that a solution might at long last be possible. Significantly, 
there also seems to be a desire by the two sides to reach their own 
settlement with minimal external input. However, while most issues 
can be dealt with at a bilateral level, security is one specific area 
that necessarily requires outside involvement, whether in terms of 
input from Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom – the three 
Guarantor Powers – of from the wider international community. 
This paper explores the various dimensions of the security debate, 
examining the implications of a continued Greek and Turkish 
military presence on the island and the proposals for 
demilitarisation, which will require a rather more comprehensive 
approach to security than has hitherto been the case. In ensuring 
the island’s domestic stability, as well as securing its external 
defences, inventive thinking will be needed to reach some form of 
acceptable mechanism to ensure the island’s post-solution 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
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On 21 March, Dimitris Christofias, the newly elected President of Cyprus, and 
leader of the Greek Cypriot community, met his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, 
Mehmet Ali Talat, in Nicosia.1 Emerging from their discussions, the two men 
announced that, after a four year hiatus, a new attempt to solve the Cyprus 
Problem would now be launched. The announcement was immediately lauded 
by the international community. Forty five years after the conflict first 
emerged, and three and a half decades after the island was divided, there now 
appeared to be a real prospect that finally the two sides could reach a 
settlement.2 Such optimism was driven by the fact that unlike previous 
initiatives, this new attempt to find a settlement would be a process handled by 
the two sides themselves. The United Nations, which has traditionally taken the 
lead role in settlement efforts, would take far less prominent role than has 
traditionally been the case.3 While it would be ready and available to act as a 
mediator, or provide technical advice or assistance to the process, the effort to 
resolve the island’s political problems would essentially be managed by the two 
                                                 
1
 Mehmet Ali Talat is the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which 
unilaterally declared independence in 1983 and is currently recognised only by the Republic of Turkey.  
2
 There is an extensive literature on the Cyprus Problem. For some of the more recent works, see: 
Hannay (2005); Ker-Lindsay (2005); Tocci, (2007). 
3
 For the evolution of the peacemaking role of the UN in Cyprus, see Richmond (1998). 
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sides acting on their own accord, at least in the first instance. The value of this 
approach seemed to be confirmed when, just months later, in July, the two 
sides confirmed that high-level negotiations would now begin. This process 
officially started on 3 September. 
While this attempt by the sides to find a solution on their own marks an 
important development, there is one area that cannot be tackled as a wholly 
indigenous issue to be resolved through direct discussions between the two 
sides: security. On almost every other key question, it is widely accepted that 
the two communities can, and should, find their own solutions free from 
external interference. Questions relating to constitutional structures and 
governance, territorial readjustment, the economy are all perfectly amenable to 
solution by the two sides with minimal external involvement. However, while 
the two leaders established a working group to examine security, the topic 
cannot be wholly, if not largely, addressed in a communal framework. For a 
start, security represents the key underlying problem between the two sides. 
While they may be able to trust each other on a number of practical day-to-day 
issues, it will take time for the legacy of the island’s violent past to subside. 
Secondly, the current constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus, as 
established in 1960, gives Britain, Greece and Turkey a direct say in the 
political and security affairs of Cyprus. Thirdly, any agreement reached 
between the two sides will almost certainly have to be policed by an external 
body. And, lastly, questions arise over the defence of the island. To this extent, 
any discussions relating to security necessarily require a far broader, 
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international input. This article examines the various issues that arise when 
considering questions relating to security and the attempts to put in place a 
post-solution security regime. 
 
2. Security as a factor in the Cyprus Problem 
It is hard to downplay or minimise the role of security as a factor in the Cyprus 
Problem. Indeed, it can rightly be regarded as the most contentious issue that 
needs to be addressed in any settlement process. For example, in April 2004,4 
75 per cent of Greek Cypriots who voted against the UN proposals for 
reunification (the Annan Plan) cited fears over security as their primary reason 
for opposing the settlement.5 As far as many Greek Cypriots were concerned, 
the arrangements put in place under the terms of the UN proposal were wholly 
insufficient to reduce Turkey’s influence over the island’s affairs. Specifically, 
the proposals envisaged a continuation of the three 1960 treaties that formed a 
cornerstone of the constitutional settlement that formed the basis of the 
independent Republic of Cyprus.6 These three documents – the Treaty of 
Alliance, the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee – allowed 
Greece and Turkey to station military forces on the island, granted Britain 
sovereign bases in Cyprus, and gave Britain, Greece and Turkey a right of 
                                                 
4
 The text of the main provisions of the Annan Plan, including the Constitution of the United Cyprus 
Republic, can be found as an appendix to Ker-Lindsay (2005), pp.165-193. 
5
 Exit Poll, Mega Television, 24 April 2004. For an examination of how security affected Greek 
Cypriots at the time, see Lordos (2004) and Faustmann (2004). For an analysis of why the Greek 
Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, see Chadjipatelis and Andreadis (2007).  
6
 Constitution of the United Cyprus Republic. Article 6 and Article 18. 
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intervention, and allow Greece and Turkish to retain military forces on the 
island.7  
The problem is that this issue marks a fundamental point of difference between 
the two communities. As far as most Greek Cypriots are concerned, any 
settlement must see the full withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island of 
Cyprus as well as the end to the right of intervention.8 Quite apart from the fact 
that these treaties were imposed on Cyprus in 1960, and that their continuation 
would amount to an ongoing infringement of the essential sovereignty of the 
Republic of Cyprus, or its successor entity, many believe that such archaic 
ideas have no place in governing the actions of a state in the 21st century, 
especially one that is now a full member of the European Union. In contrast, 
many Turkish Cypriots are equally insistent that any settlement must safeguard 
their physical security as a community and that this can only be achieved with 
the continued Turkish military presence on the island, protected under binding 
international agreements. In this context, the two communities remain 
fundamentally at odds with one another over the issue of security.  
Addressing these diametrically opposed views will not be easy as it is not only 
centred on the security imbalance between the two communities in Cyprus, but 
also involves a wider regional security imbalance. On the island, there is a 
fundamental asymmetry between the two communities. The Turkish Cypriots, 
                                                 
7
 The full texts of the three 1960 treaties – the Treaty of Alliance, the Treaty of Establishment and the 
Treaty of Guarantee – can be found in Macris (2003). 
8
 A poll conducted in early September 2008 showed that 82 per cent believed that all Turkish troops 
should leave the island, while only 17 per cent accepted that some could stay. ‘Poll shows little 
optimism for a solution’, Cyprus Mail, 9 September 2008. 
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who represent approximately 20 per cent of the island’s population, naturally 
fear the numerical strength of the Greek Cypriots, who represent almost all of 
the remaining population.9 They therefore see themselves as the endangered 
community, at risk from a far larger community that has attacked it in the past. 
In contrast, the Greek Cypriots tend to view things from a very different 
perspective. While they may be the majority on the island, Turkey’s population 
of 70 million means that they in fact see themselves as the vastly weaker party 
in a regional context. Just as the Greek Cypriots outnumber the Turkish 
Cypriots by a ratio of 5:1 on the island, so Turks and Turkish Cypriots 
outnumber Greeks and Greek Cypriots by a similar proportion in the regional 
context. And just as many Turkish Cypriots believe that the Greek Cypriots 
wish to dominate them, if not eradicate them altogether, many Greeks, both in 
Greece and Cyprus, continue to believe that Turkey maintains expansionist 
aims, not only in Cyprus, but also in the Aegean. 
This essential asymmetry, compounded by a deep sense of mistrust about the 
underlying motives each side has, makes any efforts at compromise extremely 
difficult. While the Turkish Cypriots may see the presence of Turkish forces on 
the island, which currently are estimated to be in the region of 35,000 troops 
(Jenkins, 2008), as a necessary guarantee of their safety and security vis-à-vis 
the Greek Cypriot community, the Greek Cypriots view them as a hostile 
                                                 
9
 The relative figures have traditionally been as follows: Greek Cypriots (78 per cent), Turkish Cypriots 
(18 per cent), with the remaining 4 per cent made up of the three religious communities: the 
Armenians, Latins and Maronites. Of course, in the contemporary context, and especially with the 
influx of Turkish settlers in Northern Cyprus and the arrival of many EU citizens since accession, the 
demography of the island has changed significantly. In fact, Cyprus now has the highest number of 
immigrants per head in the entire European Union.  
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occupation force that could at some stage represent a threat to the rest of the 
island that remains under the full and effective control of the Government of 
Cyprus. The question, therefore, is how to address this military presence in a 
manner that is likely to leave the Turkish Cypriots feeling sufficiently secure 
that the Turkish Army will be able to continue to guarantee their safety and 
security, but in a manner that leaves the Greek Cypriots feeling confident that 
the sole purpose of these troops is to provide security for the Turkish Cypriots? 
 
2.1. Reducing Greek and Turkish forces in Cyprus 
In the first instance, it would seem necessary to address the fundamental 
concerns that exist between the two communities on the island. Managing this 
will not be easy, but some ideas have been advanced that might yet play a role. 
Most notably, it has been suggested that Cyprus would be demilitarised and all 
local defence forces would be disbanded. While this may certainly be a 
laudable idea, it does raise problems regarding the island’s defence that will be 
examined later on. The problem, however, is that while the disbanding of local 
forces has been widely hailed as an important step in ensuring peace and 
security between the two communities – although, as will be examined, it 
opens up other questions – it does not answer the question of Greek and 
Turkish troops, despite the clear intention of the Greek Cypriots to ensure that 
demilitarisation refers to the removal of all forces from Cyprus. 
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While the Turkish Cypriots might be willing to forego a Cypriot defence force, 
as noted already they do not want to see the departure of all Turkish troops 
from Cyprus – a position that was restated by Talat just after the resumption of 
direct high level talks.10 The question is how to make this more palatable to the 
Greek Cypriots. First and foremost, it seems clear that the presence of such a 
large and well armed Turkish military force as currently exists is widely 
considered to be wholly unnecessary for the defence of the Turkish Cypriot 
community. A far smaller, lightly-armed force could perform the same role. 
Under the Annan Plan, there would have been a dramatic reduction in the 
number of troops. By 2011, the total number of personnel for each contingent 
would not exceed 6,000, falling to 3,000 by 2018. Thereafter the total number 
of Greek and Turkish personnel would have been limited to 950 and 650 
respectively, with the arrangement being reviewed every three years with the 
eventual aim of the full withdrawal of such forces (Article 8). In the view of 
many Greek Cypriots, this was not enough. Instead, it has been suggested that a 
faster, and more significant, withdrawal schedule be put in place. This is 
certainly an idea that can be explored. 
Meanwhile, other ideas have also been suggested. For instance, would it be 
possible to place the contingents under the authority of a wider peacekeeping 
mission? The problem with this idea is that Turkey may well object to any 
attempt to have their forces placed under external command in Cyprus, which 
remains a sensitive national issue. Therefore, while this might be worth 
                                                 
10
 ‘Turkish Cypriots: Security guarantees needed’, Associated Press, 10 September 2008. 
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pursuing, it may be better considered as an intermediate-stage measure. In the 
first few years following a settlement, the contingents would remain 
independent, but after a certain period they would then be incorporated into a 
larger multinational force. Another question relates to the guarantees that could 
be put in place to ensure Turkish compliance with any agreement. One question 
frequently asked in 2004 was what would happen if Turkey argued that it was 
not able to reduce its forces for some reason? Would the international 
community be willing or able to enforce compliance under such circumstances? 
Of course, it should be stressed that an attempt to address some of these 
concerns in a UN Security Council resolution just prior to the referendum was 
vetoed by Russia – a move that was widely believed to been taken at the behest 
of the Papadopoulos administration.11 Nevertheless, the question of 
implementation of security issues is a very real fear on the part of the Greek 
Cypriots and is something that should be taken into consideration in any talks 
on security. 
At the same time, any attempt to deal with the issue of the troops should also 
address the wider strategic dimensions of the issue. It is important to recognise 
that any decision to keep Greek and Turkish troops in Cyprus is likely to 
perpetuate a general feeling that Cyprus remains a potential flashpoint for 
ethnic conflict between the island’s two communities, and that Cyprus remains 
                                                 
11
 ‘What Was in It for Russia?’, Moscow Times, 27 April 2004. ‘Russian Veto defeats Security Council 
draft resolution on Cyprus’, UN News Centre, 21 April 2004’; Tassos Papadopoulos insisted that he 
had not asked Moscow to block the resolution, but the Russian press reported that he had: ‘Russia takes 
care of Cypriots’, Pravda, 22 April 2004. The last time Russia had vetoed a UN Security Council 
resolution had been in 1993, on a question relating to the funding of UNFICYP. 
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a source of potential tension between Athens and Ankara. In this sense, it 
would seem worthwhile trying to present any decision to keep troops on the 
island in a way that would not suggest that they are there to protect the 
communities against one another. Instead, it would be worth trying to present 
their presence as a means of safeguarding a settlement against those marginal, 
but potentially violent, elements within the two communities that might try to 
disrupt a solution. The two contingents would be cast in terms of being the 
guardians of an overall settlement, rather than the guardians of their 
community. 
More importantly still, any settlement must also be seen to play a part in the 
reduction of overall tensions between Greece and Turkey. Of course, the 
process of Greek-Turkish rapprochement, which has been ongoing since 1999, 
has served to lessen the threat of conflict in recent years.12 However, a historic 
agreement on Cyprus, especially in the context of a settlement of the 
outstanding Aegean disputes, would represent a fundamental revision of 
Eastern Mediterranean peace and security. For far too long, Cyprus has been 
seen as a piece of strategic real estate by Athens and Ankara. To Turkey, 
Cyprus is viewed as way by which Greece can extend a front against the ‘soft 
underbelly’ of the Turkish peninsula (Birch, 2003). This concern must be 
acknowledged. At the same time, it should be recognised that without such a 
‘perceived’ threat, whether real or not, Turkey’s rationale for retaining a major 
                                                 
12
 For an analysis of contemporary Greek-Turkish relations and the process of rapprochement see, inter 
alia, Aydin and Ifantis (2004); Carkoglu and Rubin (2005); Ker-Lindsay (2007); Öniş and Yilmaz 
(2008); and Anastasakis, Nicolaidis and Oktem (2009). 
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troop presence on the island is severely undermined. If one considers the 
positions of Greece and Turkey, it quickly become evident that Cyprus holds 
no offensive value for Turkey vis-à-vis Greece, nor does it have any defensive 
value for Greece vis-à-vis Turkey. Trying to attack Greece from Cyprus is 
pointless when Turkey has many facilities far closer. Likewise, for Greece, 
Cyprus cannot possible serve as a base from which to defend the Greek 
mainland, or even its most easterly islands. In this regard, placing Cyprus off 
limits to both sides in any meaningful military way by ensuring that the small 
contingents that remain are solely there for the purposes of communal 
protection would undoubtedly serve to enhance the overall process of Greek-
Turkish détente and remove a source of friction. To this extent, the removal of 
all Greek and Turkish air and naval bases on the island, would undoubtedly 
contribute to the wider regional impact of a settlement and would also help to 
insulate Cyprus in the unfortunate event that there was a return to tensions 
between Greece and Turkey. 
 
2.2. The Treaty of Guarantee and the right of intervention 
While the question of the presence of Greek and Turkish troops is an important 
issue, it is intimately linked to the question of the Treaty of Guarantee and the 
right of intervention. As noted already, most Greek Cypriot remain deeply 
opposed to the 1960 agreements that vested Britain, Greece and Turkey with 
the constitutional responsibility to guarantee the sovereignty, independence and 
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territorial integrity of the new state and, under Article 4 of the Treaty, gave the 
three countries a legal right of intervention, either jointly or singly, to counter 
any perceived threat to the Republic of Cyprus.13 After all, it as this right that 
was used by Turkey when it intervened in July 1974, following a Greek 
military coup on the island, which overthrew the then president, Archbishop 
Makarios, and was widely seen as a prelude to the island’s union with Greece.14 
In contrast, the majority of Turkish Cypriots still view the Treaty of Guarantee 
as an essential element of their overall security.15 To this extent, the 
maintenance of the Treaty of Guarantee is often presented by Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriots as a fundamental red line that cannot be crossed in any 
negotiations. 
Some form of compromise is therefore needed. One suggestion has been to 
introduce a term limit of some sort on the Treaty. For example, the treaty could 
be amended to expire when Turkey joins the European Union. This idea of a 
‘sunset clause’ has in fact received widespread attention and is seen by many to 
be a rather obvious and logical approach to the issue. It is also an idea that 
might find favour in Turkey. For instance, in recent years several senior 
military commanders have noted that if Turkey were to join the European 
Union the issue of Cyprus, and the Aegean, could be solved very quickly – 
                                                 
13
 The exact text reads as follows: ‘In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, 
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the 
representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions; In so far as common or 
concerted action may not prove possible, each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take 
action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.’ 
14
 For the most up-to-date analyses of the events of 1974, see Asmussen (2008). 
15
 A poll in 2005 showed that the continuation of the treaties was considered unacceptable by 60 per 
cent of Greek Cypriots, with only 19 per cent willing to accept their continuance. In contrast, 62 per 
cent of Turkish Cypriots saw their continuation as acceptable, whereas 28 per cent saw them as 
unacceptable (Lordos et al., 2005:11). 
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even though he insisted that Turkish troops must remain in Cyprus.16 This 
indicates that they understand that EU accession will change the fundamental 
pattern of relations between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. Of course, the danger 
is that if Turkey does not join the European Union then it will retain this right 
of intervention in perpetuity. This is something that will also have to be 
considered, especially given the depth of opposition to Turkish membership 
that exists in parts of the European Union, notably France and Austria, which 
makes such an outcome a distinct possibility. 
Meanwhile, other ideas have also been put forward. For example, it has been 
suggested by Greek Cypriots that any attempt to impose a demand that a right 
of intervention must be confirmed by the UN Security Council.17 This is an 
idea that would almost certainly be rejected by Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots.18 Such a system would place an unacceptable limitation of Turkey’s 
right to act under what might be extremely pressing circumstances. Similarly, 
while one might suppose that the Greek Cypriots might be willing to accept a 
Turkish military presence stationed in the Turkish Cypriot areas, and limited to 
operating in those areas, thus preventing them from having access to Greek 
Cypriot areas, this is not the case. While the fear of Turkish troops operating in 
Greek Cypriot areas was indeed one of the key concerns expressed by many 
Greek Cypriots at the time of the 2004 referendum, the underlying danger with 
                                                 
16
 ‘H. Ozkok: Turkish Troops Must Remain in Cyprus’, MPA, 18 October 2003. 
17
 Faustmann, ‘Cyprus: Security Concerns and the Failure of the Annan Plan’, p.52. 
18
 Alexandros Lordos ‘The Security Aspect of the Cyprus Problem: Towards a creative resolution’, 
paper circulated in April 2008. The paper was subsequently printed in the Friends of Cyprus Report, 
Issue 51, Summer 2008, with responses by Costa Carras (A European Response) and Ustun Erguder (A 
Turkish Response).  
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this idea is that it might encourage Turkish Cypriots to remain in place in the 
Turkish Cypriot component state, thus perpetuating the divisions between the 
two communities.19 
 
3. Protecting and preserving Cyprus I: Peacekeeping 
Even if an agreement can be reached over the presence of Greek and Turkish 
troops on the island, and the limits of intervention, it is clear that some form of 
extra security will be needed to ensure that any agreement reached between the 
two sides holds. Most obviously, it is accepted that any final settlement will 
require some form of peacekeeping mission to be put in place. First of all, it 
should be pointed out that unlike many other international operations 
conducted in post-conflict societies in the past decade and a half – such as the 
UN missions in Cambodia (UNTAC), East Timor (UNTAET) or Kosovo 
(UNMIK) – Cyprus will not need a large civilian component, or executive 
administrative capability. By all accounts, both communities currently operate 
strong and functioning democratic systems. There is simply no need for the UN 
to manage the transition in any major way, let alone take over the actual 
administration of the country on a temporary basis.20 Indeed, it hardly seems 
likely that it would have to carry out even basic functions, such as overseeing 
elections. Instead, any peacekeeping operation will have to perform fairly 
routine traditional peacekeeping duties, such as managing any outbreaks of 
                                                 
19
 Alexandros Lordos ‘The Security Aspect of the Cyprus Problem: Towards a creative resolution’, 
paper circulated in April 2008. 
20
 This idea has, nevertheless, been suggested (Richmond, 2006). 
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localised violence and conflict and monitoring the positions of Greek and 
Turkish military forces, should they remain. 
In this sense, the most major question confronting any peacekeeping mission in 
Cyprus is the type of mission to be deployed. Is it still necessary to maintain a 
force of several hundred, as is currently the case with the United Nations Force 
in Cyprus (UNFICYP), or could these duties be carried out by a much smaller 
observation force? At the time of the 2004 referendum, it was recognised that a 
new UN mission, which would have taken over from UNFICYP had the Annan 
Plan been accepted, would have to be larger than the current mission. With 
greater freedom of movement, it was deemed necessary to increase the number 
of peacekeepers. However, whether such a large force would be needed today 
is certainly questionable. It has now been over five years since the line was 
opened, in April 2003, and since then the two communities have had fairly free 
access across the dividing line. Contrary to initial fears and expectations that 
the end of restrictions on movement across the Line might lead to new fighting 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in the time since the line was opened 
there have in fact been remarkably few serious incidents between the two 
communities.21 Indeed, in a review of peacekeeping conducted after the 2004 
referendum, the idea of downgrading UNFICYP to an observer mission was 
even mooted.22  
                                                 
21
 As one prominent Greek Cypriot human rights lawyer commented to the author, since the line was 
opened in 2003, there have been many more, and far more serious, incidents between fans of rival 
Greek Cypriot football clubs than between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.  
22
 ‘Annan: Time for a Review of UNFICYP’, Cyprus Mail, 3 June 2004. 
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While this idea was eventually rejected in favour of a major 30 per cent 
reduction in the number of troops serving with UNFICYP, which included a 
new operational concept that emphasised a more centralised mission, thereby 
reducing the need for forces all along the buffer-zone,23 the fact that it was even 
suggested is indicative of a widespread belief that the era of direct 
intercommunal confrontation and fighting is over. Times have moved on and it 
now seems highly unlikely that the two communities would ever resort to 
armed conflict. While such a view would seem to be justified given the 
development of relations between the two communities over the past half-
decade, there is undoubtedly a sense of caution. Indeed, a poll taken in 
September 2008 showed that this was the single greatest concern of Greek 
Cypriots when considering a solution.24 While there would indeed seem to be 
good reasons to suppose that the era of armed conflict between the two 
communities is over, a settlement could open up new problems. For example, 
tensions may emerge over the right of refugees to return. Likewise, one cannot 
tell how politics will develop between the two communities. If tensions do 
emerge, then even relatively minor incidents can take on wider significance and 
can become an outlet for resentments and tension. At the same time, those 
actively opposed to an agreement may well seek to try to undermine the new 
state of affairs. One simply cannot discount the fact that there may be acts of 
                                                 
23
 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus’, UN Security Council 
document S/2004/756, 24 September 2004. 
24
 As the report noted, ‘As to the fears haunting Greek Cypriots in case of a solution, the biggest one 
(43 per cent) is that the accepted solution will not function and there will be disagreements and clashes. 
Other fears include the destruction of the Cyprus Republic (21 per cent) and the loss of national 
identity (20 per cent). Turkish Cypriots also fear that the solution will not work (36 per cent).’ ‘Poll 
shows little optimism for a solution’, Cyprus Mail, 9 September 2008. 
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provocation staged to undermine the settlement and foster conflict between the 
two communities. 
For this reason, and despite the apparent changes to the nature of the conflict on 
the island, it would seem prudent to maintain, if not increase the number of 
peacekeepers in Cyprus, at least until such time as the post-solution 
environment takes shape and a full reappraisal of peacekeeping needs can be 
carried out. Ultimately and eventually, it is to be hoped that Cyprus would not 
need a peacekeeping force at all. However, for the meanwhile, it seems likely 
that a fairly sizeable mission will be required in the event that a solution is 
reached. The question that will need to be answered, and which will be 
examined later on, is what organisation would be best placed to carry this out. 
 
4. Protecting and preserving Cyprus II: External Defence 
Important though it is, peacekeeping is just one part of the security equation. 
Another factor to be considered is the island’s overall defence. Traditionally, 
security in the Cyprus context has been defined in very insular (in the true 
sense of the word) or regional terms. Essentially, it has been conceived of in 
terms of how to protect the communities from one another, or how to protect 
the island from Greece or Turkey. In reality, though, any thinking on Cyprus 
must necessarily take a far broader approach. According to the prevailing 
wisdom, this would have a generally positive effect on relations between the 
two communities following a settlement and has thus been repeatedly endorsed 
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by many sections of the international community, including both Britain and 
Greece.25 Indeed, it has also been accepted as a basic principle of any 
settlement, as indicated in the 2004 UN reunification proposals, which 
explicitly called for the disbanding of such forces (Article 8).  
The problem is that while this may indeed help to reduce sources of friction 
between the two communities, once cannot overlook the fact that this could 
leave Cyprus in a very precarious position – if not now, then possibly in the 
future. Lying at the far eastern end of the Mediterranean, Cyprus is located in a 
distinctly unstable region. Apart from Turkey, its closest neighbour, which lies 
40 miles north of the island, the nearest countries to Cyprus are Syria, Lebanon, 
Israel and Egypt. The Greek island of Crete, the nearest territory of another EU 
member state is 250 miles away. In this sense, it is perhaps unduly risky to 
conceptualise any solution relating to security purely in terms of local 
conditions, and within the framework of traditional Greek-Turkish rivalry. Any 
solution should also take into account the wider geo-political environment. 
Certainly, one can argue that Cyprus currently has good relations with almost 
all of its neighbours, with the obvious exception of Turkey, and that this would 
make thought of wider defence unnecessary. However, while this thinking 
might be appropriate under the current circumstances, is it likely to remain so 
in the future? It is also worth considering that security is not simply related to 
the threat from other states. In contemporary terms, security is defined to 
                                                 
25
 See, for example, ‘British envoy agrees with demilitarisation, says Spokesman’, Cyprus News 
Agency, 24 February 1997; ‘1997 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting: The Edinburgh 
Communiqué’, Commonwealth Secretariat, October 1997; ‘Simitis-Clerides reaffirm common front, no 
postponement of S-300s’, Athens News Agency, 28 August 1998. 
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include a range of other threat, such as terrorism and various forms of 
trafficking – be it drugs, weapons, or people. Cyprus needs to be able to 
manage these threats. Indeed, it is likely that many Cypriots would not feel 
entirely comfortable about disbanding their defence forces entirely. 
To this extent, there are several ideas worth exploring. First of all, despite the 
prevailing support for removing all armed forces from the island amongst the 
current Greek Cypriot leadership, one obvious answer would be to abandon the 
idea of demilitarisation and allow Cyprus to retain a small military force of its 
own. This is an idea that has been put forward by some Greek Cypriots – 
including Ioannis Cassoulides, the DISY candidate lost the run-off vote against 
Christofias in the February 2008 presidential election – who argue that an 
alternative answer would be to create a professional army.26 This idea certainly 
has a degree of merit. As noted, Cyprus does face external threats and security 
challenges that it will need to manage. However, the idea of creating a military 
force after a settlement is an idea that certainly carries risks. It should not be 
forgotten that one of the factors that led to the destabilisation of the 1960 
constitution was the disagreement over the defence forces. While the Greek 
Cypriots wanted to have mixed units established, in line with the constitutional 
provision of a division of 60:40 between the two main communities, the 
Turkish Cypriots demanded separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot units. Such a 
problem could re-emerge in any new settlement, and will need to be tackled 
effectively if it is not to become an unnecessary source of tension between the 
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 Andreas Theophanous, ‘A demilitarised Cyprus with UK bases and Turkish guarantees’, Cyprus 
Mail, 5 October 2008. 
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two communities. How this could be done is not entirely clear, but experience 
from other divided societies, such as Belgium and Switzerland, might prove 
instructive should this option be considered at some point. 
Another approach might be to argue in favour of creating limited defence 
capabilities. While a number of states that have been demilitarised have 
foregone any sort of defence forces, either because of a lack of any identifiable 
external threats or because their security is underwritten by another state,27 
there are states that, while not having standing armies, have chosen to retain 
certain defensive capabilities. For instance, Iceland, which is a member of 
NATO, does not have an army, but does retain an air defence system and an 
armed coast guard, the latter being utilised in a confrontation with Britain in the 
1970s – the so called Cod Wars.28 Likewise, Panama, while having no army, 
retains a range of defence capabilities.29 To this end, a second alternative might 
be to consider allowing Cyprus to retain a number of defensive capabilities 
such as an armed coast guard and an air defence system, but not a standing 
army. An armed coast guard, for instance, would allow Cyprus to manage a 
number of key security issues, such as tackling various types of smuggling and 
trafficking. An air defence system could also provide Cyprus with an extra 
sense of security. 
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 The states without any armed forces include: Andorra, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, 
Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Vatican and most of the 
Pacific island states (Fiji and Tonga being notable exceptions). 
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 ‘On this day: 7 January 1976: Iceland and Britain clash at sea’, BBC News. 
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 However, there are questions being asked about whether these forces are a de facto army. ‘An Army 
is All but Name: Is Panama Really Demilitarized?’, The Panama News, Volume 14, Number 10, May 
19-June 7, 2008. 
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In the event that neither option is developed, the two most obvious options to 
handle the security of the island are the two least acceptable: Turkey and 
Britain. Turkey’s proximity to the island, and its large military force, would in 
many ways make it an ideal option for overseeing the island’s defence. 
However, it would be politically unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots under any 
circumstances. The legacy of the past is simply too great. While the Turkish 
Cypriots would undoubtedly be willing to see such a system put in place, if it 
were even to be put on the table, there is simply no chance that any Greek 
Cypriot would be willing to entrust their wider security to a country that they 
believe is determined to assert its dominance over the whole island. In fact, 
such an idea would be tantamount to making Cyprus an official protectorate of 
Turkey. Indeed, if such an idea were to be presented as part of any settlement it 
would all but guarantee that the settlement would again be rejected by the 
Greek Cypriot community, even if this was cast in terms of a minimal on the 
ground presence, such as managing air defence. But there are other reasons 
why this might not work. Having Turkey in charge of the overall security of 
Cyprus, an EU member, could serve as a sore between the two in the event that 
relations between Turkey and the EU deteriorate. Indeed, under these 
circumstances Cyprus could in fact become a pawn in the relationship, a 
situation that few in Europe would want to see happen. Indeed, even keeping 
the Treaty of Guarantee could be problematic in this context. In any case, for 
all these reasons, any suggestion that Turkey might be able to play a direct, let 
alone leading, role in the post-settlement defence of Cyprus – as logical as it 
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might sound in terms of Turkey’s defence capabilities – is of no practical value 
as a suggestion. 
The other alternative is Britain. This is a more plausible idea, but only 
marginally. At present, the United Kingdom still maintains a significant 
military garrison on the island, located in the two Sovereign Base Areas 
granted to Britain under the agreements that saw Cyprus become an 
independent state, in 1960. However, the United Kingdom is in no position to 
offer any real security to the island. The SBAs are quite clearly seen as serving 
British interests in the wider Middle East and providing vital support for 
military operations in the region. They are simply not equipped to carry out 
major defensive functions on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus, or a successor 
state. Of course, steps could be taken to upgrade the forces on the island, but 
this would be an extremely costly undertaking. More to the point, this is not 
something that London would want to take on, either politically or strategically. 
Notwithstanding the useful role the Bases continue to play at present, it is 
perhaps worth noting that Britain itself seems unsure about the future of the 
Bases, or at least a substantial part of them. Officially speaking, the line is that 
Britain retains full sovereignty over the Bases. However, there have been a 
number of very clear indications over the years that London might be willing to 
relinquish some of the territory under the right conditions. This was seen most 
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clearly in 2003, when Britain formally offered to cede the Western Sovereign 
Base Area to the post-solution Cypriot state in the event of a settlement.30 
More importantly, it is highly unlikely that either community would be willing 
to accept such a role being played by the United Kingdom, even if it could do 
so. For the Greek Cypriots, the presence of the SBAs is already seen as being a 
reminder of the island’s colonial heritage. It is undoubtedly the case that most 
Greek Cypriots would like to see them removed and the land returned to the 
Republic of Cyprus.31 Indeed, there is a general sense that following a solution, 
the Greek Cypriots may well turn their attention to launching a campaign to 
remove the Bases.32 In contrast, while the Turkish Cypriots are certainly much 
more willing to accept a British presence on the island, and do not see the 
Bases as a major issue, let alone a bone of contention, they would nevertheless 
be hesitant about giving ultimate responsibility for the island’s security to the 
British Government. As they see it, the British Government is naturally more 
inclined to side with the Greek Cypriots than with them. After all, the Bases are 
essentially located in Greek Cypriot areas.33 Moreover, there is also a general 
line of argument that says that a British military presence on the island is 
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actually a security threat in its own right and should be removed – 
remembering that the threat to British forces in Cyprus was the reason cited by 
the British Government for the invasion of Iraq, in 2003. In this sense, and in 
the same way as having Turkey defend the island would make Cyprus more 
vulnerable, having a British military presence on the island might also create a 
threat to the island. 
 
5. The Role of International Security Organisations 
Under these circumstances, a natural alternative would be to look to see what 
other organisations or bodies would be tasked with responsibility for 
addressing these elements of Cyprus’ internal and external security. 
5.1. United Nations (UN) 
As suggested earlier, the first organisation that comes to mind when one thinks 
of managing post-settlement security in Cyprus is the United Nations. Since 
1964, the UN has been vested with responsibility for maintaining peace and 
security on Cyprus. This has been done through the United Nations Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP), established under the terms of Resolution 184 (1964).34 
While there are good reasons to maintain a UN peacekeeping presence in 
Cyprus, there are also valid arguments to suggest that other alternative options 
could be explored. For a start, after almost half a century in Cyprus, it might be 
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 For more on the history of UN peacekeeping on the island see, inter alia, James (2002); Stegenga, 
(1968); Harbottle (1971); Lindley (2001); Henn (2004). 
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time to draw a line under the UN’s commitment to the island and signal a new 
start by introducing a new peacekeeping body to the island. This would also 
provide an opportunity for the focus of the island’s security to be shifted 
towards more appropriate regional bodies. 
But even if the UN were to remain responsible for peacekeeping, it would not 
be able to provide the wider external security that the islands needs. For a start, 
it seems highly unlikely that there would be a widespread desire to see the 
United Nations take on such a major responsibility for the defence of a member 
state. Secondly, who would contribute to such a force? In order to create a 
viable mission, major questions relating to command and control and 
interoperability would have to be answered. There would also be the major 
question of who would provide the equipment. Traditionally, UN forces have 
tended to operate only with light arms. However, to manage a wider security 
operation, ships and aircraft would be needed. This would appear to be far too 
significant a commitment for the organisation, even if the majority of the costs 
for such a mission were to be carried by the Cypriot state.35 Therefore, for the 
element of external defence, other options would need to be explored. 
5.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
Another option would be NATO. At first glance, this would seem to be a 
natural and ideal option for dealing with both internal and external security. 
Quite apart from the fact that both Greece and Turkey are members of the 
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 That said, there have been various discussions over the years about developing a standing UN 
military capability that could be used either in a peacekeeping role, or in a war fighting capacity in the 
case of interstate conflicts. For a recent examination of some of these ideas see  Codner (2008), 
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organisation, it also unites most of Cyprus’ European partners, and also 
provides the added security that comes with the overarching role played by the 
United States. Indeed, granting NATO a direct peacekeeping role in Cyprus 
was explicitly suggested in 1999 by the Clerides Administration as part of its 
longstanding proposal for the overall demilitarisation of the island.36 However, 
the use of NATO in this role is extremely problematic in a number of ways. For 
a start, while there are many Greek Cypriots who would support a NATO 
peacekeeping presence on the island, many others have traditionally opposed 
NATO involvement in Cyprus, as indeed has Turkey, and would be likely to do 
so in the future for reasons of history and contemporary politics. 
Shortly after independence, the option of Cypriot membership of NATO was 
raised. However, it was quickly rejected by the Greek Cypriots who believed 
that the organisation would always attach greater weight and significance to 
Turkey’s views, rather than those of Greece (Clerides, 1993:124). At the same 
time, Turkey objected to membership on the grounds that it would make 
intervention, if so required, significantly more difficult.37 Instead, the new 
Republic of Cyprus opted to join the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a body it 
remained a member of until 2004, when European Union membership required 
it to leave.38 Likewise, just three years later, in 1963, when fighting broke out 
between the communities, the Greek Cypriots rejected proposals to establish a 
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NATO peacekeeping force on the island, instead pressing for the establishment 
of a UN peacekeeping mission. Thereafter, US support for the military junta in 
Greece, whose attempted coup in Cyprus in July 1974 led to the Turkish 
invasion, has left a strong legacy of anti-American sentiment across the Greek 
Cypriot political spectrum.  
All this has naturally affected wider perceptions towards NATO across Cypriot 
society, particularly on the left. NATO is still viewed with deep distrust, 
particularly by the members of AKEL, the Greek Cypriot communist party, 
which remains the strongest single political party on the island, and regularly 
attracts 30-35 per cent of the Greek Cypriot vote.39 The election of its leader, 
Demetris Christofias, to the presidency in February 2008, means that Cyprus 
also has a communist leader for the first time in its history. While the party is in 
many ways a social democratic party for most practical purposes, it 
nevertheless retains a strong rhetorical link with traditional communist 
orthodoxy. Many, if not most, members still retain an affinity for Russia, and 
hold NATO, as the key Western security apparatus, responsible for the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. In this sense, having NATO peacekeeping force in Cyprus 
would be unacceptable. So too would joining Partnership for Peace (PfP), the 
gateway to eventual membership of the organisation, which the Government of 
Cyprus has steadfastly refused to consider, even since leaving the NAM, and 
which is opposed by President Christofias.40 In this sense, even though the 
                                                 
39
 For an analysis of AKEL, see Dunphy and Bale (2007:287-304). 
40
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island is now a member of the European Union, the past continues to affect 
contemporary debates on the issue of Cyprus’ relations with the West as a 
whole. 
But AKEL’s objections are also likely to be shaped by more contemporary 
concerns. Most importantly, it is very sensitive to Russian concerns about the 
extent of NATO expansion – an issue that was highlighted by the Russian-
Georgian Conflict in August 2008. Quite apart from understanding, and 
sharing, Moscow’s concerns on this issue, many in AKEL, and in Greek 
Cypriot society more widely, would not want to antagonise the Russian 
Government. While there is an obvious imbalance in their relationship, Cyprus 
and Russia have a close relationship, and the two in fact perform useful roles 
for one another. For the Greek Cypriots, Russia is a vital ally in its attempts to 
limit, or stave off, what it believes to be undue pressure from the United States 
and Britain in terms of a solution. The most obvious way in which it is able to 
do this is by its veto powers in the UN Security Council. This was seen when 
Russia blocked a UN resolution on security in the run up to the referendum. 
Moreover, Russia served to ensure that any suggestions that UNFICYP be 
substantially cut, or downgraded to an observer mission, following the 
referendum in 2004, both of which were feared by the Greek Cypriots, were 
blocked (Ker-Lindsay, 2006:.415). In return for this support, Cyprus acts as a 
useful voice for Russia in certain international fora, such as the Council of 
Europe and, most importantly of all, the European Union.41 In this regard, it 
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can be argued that while Cyprus may not be a major partner for Russia, they 
have performed useful roles for each other. 
Still, it must be recognised that despite the ongoing opposition to NATO by 
AKEL in recent years there appears to have been a marked shift in thinking 
amongst many Greek Cypriots towards NATO. This appears to be particularly 
obvious amongst those on the centre-right and also, it would seem, amongst 
moderate nationalists.42 As a result, there appear to be a body of opinion that 
seems willing to take a more positive view of NATO as an obvious body to 
secure the island’s security, and have openly suggested as much.43 However, 
even amongst those that might be more predisposed towards NATO than was 
once the case there is still an element of doubt and mistrust. Although many 
Greek Cypriots recognise that NATO has changed since the end of the Cold 
War, they nevertheless remain wary about being integrated into an organisation 
where the United States still wields such direct and significant control. The old 
fear that the organisation would put Turkish interests above those of Greece, let 
alone the Greek Cypriots, is likely to remain strong. To this extent, many Greek 
Cypriots will want to keep a security balance and have a Russian counterweight 
available. All this means that the deep distrust, if not hostility, towards NATO 
amongst a significant proportion of Greek Cypriots, coupled with Nicosia’s 
continued friendship with Russia, means that NATO is unlikely to be a viable 
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option for managing post-solution security, either in terms of peacekeeping or 
in terms of the island’s wider defence and security needs. 
5.3. European Union (EU) 
Looking beyond the UN and NATO, a third option would be to look at some 
form of European Union presence. Again, this could be problematic. For 
example, such a force is likely to be unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots and 
Turkey, who could well argue that as Turkey is not a member of the European 
Union, whereas Greece is, the force would not be truly impartial. Such a 
concern would also be echoed in Turkey, where there may well be fears that 
any attempt to intervene in the face of an EU force could have very serious 
implications in terms of Turkey’s overall relationship with the Union. Such 
concerns are not without justification. Even if the Greek Cypriots were to be 
excluded from decision-making on the issue, one must recognise that the force 
could also be subject to pressure from Athens, and might even involve Greek 
decision-makers in a direct way – for example, either in Brussels or as part of 
the civilian component of the force. Even if this were not the case, one must 
recognise that the perception of impartiality is just as important as being 
impartiality. 
Ironically, the Greek Cypriots might not be that in favour of the idea either. 
Once again, there are questions relating to the degree to which the European 
Union would be capable of undertaking wider security duties relating to the 
island’s defence. With no standing army of its own, the European Union would 
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be unable to perform a long-term defence role in Cyprus at present. To do so 
would also require close co-operation with NATO, which would almost 
certainly have to be closely involved in terms of equipment and facilities. As 
such an arrangement would require the consent of all NATO members, this 
would again give Turkey a major say over the defence and security of the 
island. In this sense, a European Union approach would seem to have limited 
application at this stage, for both political and practical reasons. But this is not 
to say that this will not change. In the event of Turkish membership of the 
Union, it may well be the case that the European Union could take on a much 
larger role in Cyprus, in both a peacekeeping capacity, if still needed, and in 
terms of defence. 
5.4. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
However, there are other organisations that can be considered. One obvious 
option would be the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). This body, which acts as, ‘a primary instrument for early warning, 
conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation’, has 
considerable expertise covering a range of conflict management tasks, having 
undertaken missions throughout the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia.44. 
The other advantage is that its 56 members include all the main protagonists – 
Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Britain, Russia, the United States and the other 
members of the European Union. It would therefore seem to be a good 
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candidate for some sort of conflict management role in Cyprus after a 
settlement. Obvious tasks might include running a peacekeeping operation. 
However, the Organisation also has experience of border management tasks, 
which could help in terms of managing a number of the non-state threats to the 
island’s security. And while it may not be able to provide the high level 
security that Cyprus might need, the presence of a significant OSCE mission 
composed of a number of key international actors, and with an explicit 
responsibility for managing broader post-settlement security, would almost 
certainly act as a deterrent to any external aggressors. However, the role of the 
OSCE might also be enhanced further if Cyprus were to be able to manage 
certain security functions on its own and if the mission were to be backed up by 
some other forms of security guarantee.  
5.5. Other options for consideration 
In trying to secure the island’s external defence, consideration will have to be 
given to the wider political constraints that have already been outlined. 
However, there is certainly room for inventive thinking on this issue. It may 
well be possible to reach an answer that would address Greek Cypriot and 
Russian concerns, but would also allow the island to receive the adequate 
security and safeguards it needs in such a difficult neighbourhood. One 
suggestion might be to examine the possibility of putting in place a Security 
Council guarantee of some sort, under the terms of Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter. This would be coupled with a statement reaffirming the essential 
neutrality of Cyprus. This, in turn, would then be factored in to any 
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arrangement to provide extra external guarantees as part of the security 
arrangements envisaged under a final agreement, such as the creation, for 
example, of an OSCE mission. However, polls have shown that even this idea, 
which certainly has merit, might not be enough to win Greek Cypriot support. 
Even though the Turkish Cypriots seem strongly in favour of such an idea, 
Greek Cypriot opinion was effectively evenly divided over the issue. Once 
again, concern seemed to be centred on British and US influence over the 
Council (Lordos et al., 2005: 11-12). 
 
6. Conclusion 
As the 2004 referendum showed, security remains a key question in any effort 
to reunite Cyprus. Whether justified or not, many Greek Cypriots see security – 
cast specifically in terms of security from Turkey– as the paramount issue to be 
addressed in a settlement.45 Likewise, Turkish Cypriot often emphasise the 
importance of maintaining a clear external guarantee regarding their safety and 
security in the face of a perceived threat from the far more numerous Greek 
Cypriots. Therefore, without an agreement on the fundamental question of 
security, one could go so far as to say that an acceptable solution to the Cyprus 
Problem is unlikely to occur. However, to reach this point, it needs to be 
recognised that any agreement on security must not only address the 
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fundamental imbalance that exists between the two sides, but must also take 
into account the deep-seated concerns that the Greek Cypriots hold vis-à-vis 
Turkey. 
Managing this will not be easy as it requires balancing local and regional 
factors. However, some ideas do stand out. For instance, it is widely recognised 
that there will have to be a reduction in the number of Greek and, more 
specifically, Turkish troops on the island. However, this should be done in such 
a way as to reinforce the message that the troops that remain are not there to 
serve as the defenders of one side against the other, but are there to defend a 
settlement. Similarly, these forces should not serve as a source of tension 
between Greece and Turkey, either at the time of a settlement or in the future. 
They should be relatively lightly armed, and neither Greece nor Turkey should 
maintain other significant military facilities on the island, such as naval or air 
bases. In terms of other ideas, it might be worth exploring the idea of 
incorporating the remaining forces within a peacekeeping force at some 
appropriate moment after a settlement, as an intermediate step towards their 
full withdrawal. As for the Treaty of Guarantee, the idea of a ‘sunset clause’ 
still remains the strongest idea. 
While the internal dimensions of the problem are important, there still remain 
two key questions to be answered. The first of these relates to peacekeeping. 
Any agreement will have to include a peacekeeping element. Quite how active 
or overt this needs to be will have to be examined in the context of an overall 
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settlement. Despite the generally non-confrontational, if not cordial, way in 
which relations between the two communities have developed since the Green 
line was opened in 2003, it seems likely that a fairly significant peacekeeping 
force would be needed following a settlement, at least for the first few years. 
Many Greek and Turkish Cypriots are obviously worried about a return to 
violence in the event of a settlement breaking down, and there is always a 
danger that this may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This raises a question as 
to what would be the best body to undertake this. One obvious solution would 
be to continue with the United Nations, perhaps renaming the force to reflect 
the new state of affairs. However, there is also a good argument to free up UN 
resources and indicate a new situation by putting in place a force from another 
organisation, operating with UN Security Council authorisation. One obvious 
choice would be NATO. However, this is unlikely to be acceptable to the 
Greek Cypriots, for a variety of reasons relating to history and ties to Russia. 
Another option, therefore, would be to explore the potential role to be played 
by the OSCE. In contrast, the European Union would be unlikely to be seen as 
an acceptable neutral party by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, but may well 
be able to develop a stronger role at some point in the future.  
A second dimension is the external defence and security of Cyprus. While 
questions relating to security have usually been defined in terms of the relations 
between the two communities or between the Cyprus and the two motherlands, 
Greece and Turkey, one also has to recognise that there is a far larger 
dimension to the island’s security that needs to be considered. One idea would 
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be to abandon the principle of demilitarisation in favour of a small professional 
defence force. Alternatively, an intermediate approach could see Cyprus retain 
an air defence system and a naval force. However, if full demilitarisation is to 
be introduced, as appears likely, then sound measures will have to be put in 
place to secure the island from external threats. Again, NATO is unlikely to be 
an acceptable option, given traditional Greek Cypriot scepticism, if not 
hostility, towards the organisation. Likewise, neither Britain nor Turkey, can 
take on this responsibility. At the same time, the European Union is hardly an 
effective body to undertake these duties. This question will need to be 
addressed in greater detail.   
While security certainly represents a difficult issue, it is clear that finding the 
necessary solutions to this dimension of the Cyprus Problem is far from 
impossible. The key elements are all in place. It just requires decision to be 
made on how best to balance out the various concerns of the two sides that 
ensures that the internal and regional dimensions of the problem are neatly 
addressed in a manner that allows the Turkish Cypriots to feel safe vis-à-vis the 
Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots to feel safe vis-à-vis Turkey and the people 
of Cyprus to feel safe against other external threats to the island. 
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